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ABSTRACT
Political conflict is often described in terms of “left” and “right” even though
societal conflicts stem from various sub-dimensions such as economic and
cultural issues. We argue that individuals map parties’ left-right positions
based on party positions on such underlying dimensions, though their impact
depends on their importance for parties and citizens. To test this, we study
the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) whose programmatic appeal has
changed fundamentally in the last years, as have citizens’ issue concerns.
Using longitudinal data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES),
we find that citizens’ perceptions of the AfD’s left-right position are more
closely related to the party’s position on specific issues (1) when these issues
are prominent in the party’s communication and (2) for citizens that care
more about these issues. Moreover, how voters perceive left and right in
comparison to parties’ issue emphasis also affects vote choice. Our findings
have important implications for the meaning of left and right, electoral
behaviour, representation, and party competition.
Introduction
The left-right dimension is one of the most convenient and widely-used heu-
ristics in politics. Parties employ the language of left and right to communi-
cate their positions to voters, and citizens use left-right positions to situate
themselves and parties in order to determine who best represents their pre-
ferences and concerns. In most developed democracies, the vast majority of
citizens are able and willing to locate themselves and parties on this
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dimension (e.g. Mair 2007; Dalton, McAllister, and Farrell 2011, ch. 4 & 5). Part
of the reason for the persistence of the language of “left” and “right” might
be due to its flexibility: the left-right dimension serves as a “super issue”
(Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, 244) and an “amorphous vessel” (Huber
and Inglehart 1995, 90) with little inherent substantive meaning. The
meaning of “left” and “right” is not predetermined, and varies empirically
between individual citizens, in different contexts, and over time (Zechmeister
2006; de Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee 2013; Bauer et al. 2016).
Compared to understanding voters’ ideological self-positioning, far less
attention has been paid to the way in which citizens identify the positions
of parties on the left-right dimension. Existing research has focused on the
capability and willingness of respondents to locate parties in policy spaces
(e.g. Dahlberg 2009, 2013; Busch 2016), on the accuracy of these perceived
party policy positions (Merrill, Grofman, and Adams 2001; Barabas and Jerit
2009; Lenz 2012; Banducci, Giebler, and Kritzinger 2017; Merz 2017; Carroll
and Kubo 2018), and how citizens update their perceptions of party policy
positions (Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011, 2014, 2016; Fortunato and
Stevenson 2013; Fernandez-Vazquez 2014; Fortunato and Adams 2015;
Seeberg, Slothuus, and Stubager 2016; Plescia and Staniek 2017). Yet, rela-
tively little is known about how citizens map party policies, issues, and
frames onto party positions on the left-right dimension despite the crucial
role of this dimension for aspects like voting or political representation.
In this paper, we argue that individuals infer parties’ overall left-right
stances from party positions on ideological sub-dimensions linked to eco-
nomic and cultural issues. However, the degree to which these sub-dimen-
sions impact on the perceived left-right positions of parties depends on the
importance of these sub-dimensions to parties as well as to individuals. We
argue that citizens tend to map left-right party stances from those ideological
sub-dimensions that (1) are more prominent on the party’s issue agenda and
(2) more important to the individuals themselves. This also implies that per-
ceptions of party stances will change over time when the party’s issue empha-
sis changes and when citizens perceive different topics as most important to
them, even if the underlying party positions remain the same.
We test these arguments using public perceptions of the German Alterna-
tive für Deutschland (AfD) since its emergence in 2013. The AfD is an important
case because voter perceptions of its left-right position differ substantially
across respondents and have evolved over time. Thus, there is considerable
variation in the dependent variable. Moreover, both the party’s programmatic
appeal and public issue concerns have changed fundamentally since the
party’s emergence, so we can use this case to investigate the impact of
demand- and supply-side factors on public perceptions of party positions.
The focus on one case and a rather short period of time also has the advan-
tage that many context factors related to the institutional context and political
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culture are held constant and, thus, cannot provide confounding explanations
of voters’ perceptions of parties’ left-right positions.
We study changes in perceptions of the AfD’s left-right position using the
Long-term Online Tracking of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES)
and find strong evidence that citizens’ perceptions of the AfD’s left-right pos-
ition have changed significantly since 2013. In placing the party on the left-
right dimension, respondents paid more attention to the party’s cultural
issues after these issues became more important to the party. Moreover,
voters paid more attention to sub-dimensions that they personally regarded
as important: if they considered an issue dimension to be salient, then pos-
itions on this issue dimension influenced their left-right positioning of the
AfD more. These patterns are more pronounced for the cultural issue dimen-
sion but clearly driven by supply- and demand-side factors.
Our findings have important implications for several core aspects of elec-
toral behaviour and representative democracy. First, they add to the existing
research on the meaning of left and right (Huber and Inglehart 1995; Knutsen
1995; de Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee 2013; Bauer et al. 2016). We show
that the meaning of left and right is indeed flexible and may change over
time when (1) parties address different issue areas and when (2) the
public’s perception of issue importance changes.
Second, as the meaning of left and right varies with a party’s issue focus
and public issue concerns, ideological congruence between parties and
their voters on the left-right dimension does not necessarily imply good sub-
stantive representation. For example, high levels of left-right congruence may
be misleading if the voter’s position is mostly based on preferences on the
economy, while the party’s platform is associated with cultural issues (or
vice versa). In their influential study on ideological congruence, Golder and
Stramski (2010, 93) already acknowledge that “much depends on […]
whether the left-right dimension is perceived in the same way across the
different units.” This article points to an even bigger issue: the perception
of left-right in terms of its substantive meaning does not just vary between
countries but also between political parties and citizens in the same unit.
Third, this variation in the meaning of “left” and “right” has implications for
vote choice. We show that the left-right dimension is more meaningful for
vote choice when voter and party policy positions on that dimension are
based on the same substantive issue positions, that is, when their left-right
positions stem from similar sub-dimensions.
Finally, our results also have implications for party competition: parties can
shift their policy positions on the left-right dimension by putting different
emphasis on certain issues (Meyer and Wagner 2017). Hence, policy change
does not necessarily imply a position change on certain issues and the risks
associated with “flip-flopping.” This suggests that there are more subtle, less
risky strategies that parties can use in order to shift their policy platform.
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The left-right dimension and public perceptions of political
parties
Following the seminal work of Downs (1957), politics is understood as based
on societal conflicts for which parties advocate different policy solutions.
While parties and candidates take stances on many issues, electoral compe-
tition can be reduced to a single dimension where a “party’s net position
on this [left-right] scale is a weighted average of the positions of all the par-
ticular policies [the party] upholds” (Downs 1957, 132). It is important to
note that this does not imply identical perceptions of these positions by all
citizens. Rather, citizens may not agree on a party’s individual stances and
may attach different weights to these issues. Therefore, their perceptions of
party policy positions might vary (Downs 1957, 133).
The distinction between left and right helps citizens by providing a sim-
plified perception of political competition. The left-right heuristic is thus
useful because it simplifies thinking and talking about political divisions and
conflicts, which are often complex and multidimensional. While issue compe-
tition is increasingly important (Green-Pedersen 2007), only few citizens
develop preferences on many issues, devote the time and energy necessary
to learn about parties’ issue positions, and make their choices accordingly.
Rather, the left-right distinction is used as a shortcut and a simplified way
of comparing one’s own preferences to party policy programmes. References
to “left” and “right” are indeed frequently used in the media and public
debates to characterize party policy positions and general lines of conflict.
In consequence, the vast majority of citizens have the capacity and willingness
to locate themselves and political actors on a left-right scale (Inglehart and
Klingemann 1976; Shikano and Pappi 2004; Mair 2007).
Yet, the applicability and functional role of the left-right distinction says
little about its precise meaning. In his early criticism of Downs, Stokes
(1963, 371) questions whether the “fixed structure” assumption of economic
models travels to the political context:
Since the space represented by a transcontinental railroad depends on physical
distance, its structure is fixed, as the structure of Main Street is. […] By compari-
son, the space in which political parties compete can be of highly variable struc-
ture. Just as the parties may be perceived and evaluated on several dimensions,
so the dimensions that are salient to the electorate may change widely over
time.
Therefore, the left-right dimension is merely an “empty vessel” (Huber and
Inglehart 1995) which can be associated with different policies, issues, and
frames. This ambiguity is both an asset and a liability: on the one hand, the
vague terms are the key reason why the general dimension works in many
different contexts. On the other hand, the precise meaning of the terms
“left” and “right” very much depends on the spatial and temporal context.
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There are at least two important sub-dimensions that feed into the left-
right dimension: the economy and cultural (or libertarian-authoritarian)
issues.1 The first sub-dimension refers to policy conflicts of economic inequal-
ity, redistribution, and class conflict (e.g. Mair 2007). The economic divide has
long been the dominant way of distinguishing parties on a left-right dimen-
sion (Budge and Robertson 1987; Huber and Inglehart 1995). However, cul-
tural issues have gained importance in recent decades (Knutsen 1995;
Green-Pedersen 2007; de Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee 2013; Beramendi
et al. 2015). The emergence of issues like immigration and gender equality
has fundamentally shaped major lines of conflict in societies (see also
Inglehart 1984, 68f.; Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi et al. 2008), creating new divisions
but also diminishing the structuring effect of traditional cleavages. Conse-
quently, policy positions on both sub-dimensions affect where parties are
located on the left-right scale (e.g. Benoit and Laver 2006).2
Despite these important changes, we know relatively little about how citi-
zens map the (perceived) party issue stances on these two key sub-dimen-
sions onto the more general left-right dimension. Most studies on public
perceptions of party policy positions analyze whether individuals are
capable to locate parties in policy spaces (e.g. Dahlberg 2009, 2013; Busch
2016), under which circumstances perceived party positions represent
actual party positions (Barabas and Jerit 2009; Lenz 2012; Banducci, Giebler,
and Kritzinger 2017; Merz 2017; Carroll and Kubo 2018), and how citizens
update their perceptions of party policy positions (Adams, Ezrow, and
Somer-Topcu 2011, 2014, 2016; Fortunato and Stevenson 2013; Fernandez-
Vazquez 2014; Fortunato and Adams 2015; Seeberg, Slothuus, and Stubager
2016; Plescia and Staniek 2017). In contrast, research on the issue dimensions
underlying the left-right dimension is relatively scarce. It has been shown that
citizens’ personal left-right policy preferences are indeed increasingly associ-
ated with their views on cultural issues (de Vries, Hakhverdian, and Lancee
2013). However, the concept of representative democracy makes it necessary
to focus not only on the demand side but also on (perceptions of) the supply
side. In the following, we develop expectations on how individuals map party
policy positions onto the left-right dimension acknowledging the relevance of
both the supply and demand side. Our focus on both supply- and demand-
side factors acknowledges that electoral competition is structured both by
top-down and bottom-up factors.
1The complex topic of the EU is linked to both the economic and the cultural issue dimensions (e.g., Kriesi
et al. 2008). In an additional analysis (Appendix D, Model 2), we also account for European integration as
a third issue dimension. The results of this model lead to similar conclusions regarding our hypotheses.
2The question whether policy positions on both sub-dimensions are correlated is not crucial for our argu-
ment, at least if policy positions differ somewhat across the sub-dimensions. For example, a party with a
moderate stance on economic issues and a more radical position on cultural issues can be perceived as
more extreme if emphasizes its cultural issue stance more.
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Supply-side influences on parties’ perceived left-right positions
From a supply-side perspective, the issues that parties emphasize should affect
the meaning of the labels “left” and “right.” Parties focus on different issues,
preferring topics and ideological sub-dimensions where they have a competi-
tive advantage (Budge and Farlie 1983). These issues are often at the core of a
party’s ideology: classic examples are Green parties and the environment,
socialist parties and social welfare, or radical right parties and immigration.
Such “issue ownership” (Petrocik 1996) might also result frommere association
between a party and a particular issue (Walgrave, Lefevere, and Tresch 2012),
irrespective of a party’s perceived competence in dealing with the particular
issue. In addition, parties also adapt their issue emphasis to changes in the
environment. For example, they address issues that are prominent on the
party system agenda, particularly in response to parties that are ideologically
close to them (Green-Pedersen andMortensen 2015; Meyer andWagner 2016).
Overall, we expect that, if a party emphasizes an issue belonging either to
the economic or cultural sub-dimension, its left-right position is more likely to
be associated with that sub-dimension (see also van der Brug 2004). One con-
sequence of this is that two parties with similar perceived left-right positions
may nevertheless differ in their policy positions on economic and cultural
issues. For example, the “leftism” of Green and socialist parties is fundamen-
tally distinct: They might support “similar policies on preservation of health
care benefits, but this is a presumably more important issue to the Social
Democrats and thus is more influential in determining their overall political
identity” (Dalton, McAllister, and Farrell 2011, 124). In addition to these
cross-party differences, changing issue emphasis should also alter a party’s
perceived policy position over time. Thus, parties can change their (perceived)
party policy positions by giving more weight to certain issues (e.g. van der
Brug 2004; Meyer and Wagner 2017).
Following these arguments, we hypothesize:
H1 (party issue agenda): The more important an issue is on a party’s issue
agenda, the more the party’s perceived position on that issue influences the
party’s perceived position on the left-right dimension.
Demand-side influences on parties’ perceived left-right positions
So far we have considered how parties influence the perception of their own
left-right position. In contrast, a demand-side perspective focuses on citizens’
issue concerns. Assessing these public issue concerns in the underlying frame-
work can be understood as a mirror approach to the supply-side discussion. As
parties’ perceived left-right positions become more strongly associated with
positions regarding issues high on the party’s agenda, we argue that the
importance citizens ascribed to the different issue dimensions matters as well.
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Respondents differ in the issues they deem to be important (personal issue
emphasis). Hence, it could be that respondents, when thinking about a party’s
left-right position, take that party’s position on an issue of a specific
sub-dimension more into account if they care more about that sub-dimen-
sion. Conversely, they would not map party positions from sub-dimensions
that are not salient to them personally. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2 (personal issue emphasis): The more salient an issue is to an individual, the
more the party’s perceived position on that issue influences the party’s per-
ceived position on the left-right scale.
Case selection: the Alternative für Deutschland 2013–2016
We test our hypotheses based on voter perceptions of the German Alternative
für Deutschland (AfD) between 2013 and 2016. As such, even though our argu-
mentation is applicable to all contexts in which left-right matters, we only
present results from a single case study and for a rather limited period of
time. While this places relevant limits on the generalizability of our findings,
focusing on this specific party and a rather short time period has also
several very important advantages over alternative research designs. First,
in contrast to cross-sectional analyses, a longitudinal design has the advan-
tage that many institutional, cultural, and historical context factors can be
taken as stable and, thus, cannot figure as confounders causing variation in
voter perceptions of party left-right positions.
Second, there is substantive variation in the dependent variable, both
across respondents and over time. Obviously, both aspects are necessary con-
ditions to identify any supply- or demand-side effects. The left-right dimen-
sion is highly relevant for describing party competition in Germany.
Interestingly, voter perceptions of the AfD’s policy position have changed sub-
stantially since the party emerged in 2013. Figure 1 shows means of the
respondents’ perceived party policy positions between 2013 and 2016.
While the other German parties’ perceived left-right positions change moder-
ately at most, the AfD’s position shifts from a centrist position to a very right-
wing position (roughly three points on the 11-point scale). This change in per-
ceptions might be due to the increasing demand- and supply-side importance
of cultural issues, where the AfD is particularly right-wing.
Third, there has been substantial variation in demand- and supply-side
factors of party competition since 2013. With regard to the demand side,
public issue concerns not only vary across individuals but also changed sub-
stantially between 2013 (when the economic crisis still played a large role in
the political debate) and 2016 (when the so-called “refugee crisis” increased
the attention to cultural issue concerns).
With regard to the supply side, the AfD substantially shifted its issue
agenda within a relatively short period. When it was founded in 2013, the
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AfDmostly focused on economic issues, especially to those related to the Euro
and the management of the (Greek) debt crisis. Led by Bernd Lucke, a pro-
fessor of economics, the party opposed any financial aid to foreign countries
during the crisis, criticized established political elites, and campaigned against
the Euro and in favour of direct democracy, national sovereignty as well as
neo-liberalism. While some observers argue that some aspects of the AfD in
2013 already showed radical-right tendencies, especially the electoral candi-
dates it put forward (Lewandowsky, Giebler, and Wagner 2016), the party’s
programmatic orientation was harder to characterize (Franzmann 2014).
This changed dramatically when Lucke left the party in June 2015 due to
internal conflict. Some high-ranking party officials were no longer satisfied
with the party’s course, and within a few months, partly fostered by the so-
called “refugee crisis”, the party changed its focus to cultural issues and inten-
sified its critique of political elites, science, and the media. The AfD provides an
ideal case for testing our first hypothesis on supply-side effects because the
parties’ issue agenda changed dramatically in only a couple of months.
Fourth, in terms of data, the Long-term Online Tracking of the German
Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) is particularly well-suited to answering
Figure 1. German citizens’ perceptions of party left-right positions (means).
Note: German Longitudinal Election Study, Rattinger et al. (2015a, 2015b) and Roßteutscher et al. (2016).
Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for the mean perceived party positions. AfD, Alternative for
Germany; CDU, Christian Democratic Union; CSU, Christian Social Union; FDP, Free Democratic Party;
Greens, Alliance 90/The Greens; Linke, The Left; and SPD, Social Democratic Party of Germany.
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our research question (Rattinger et al. 2015a, 2015b; Roßteutscher et al. 2016).
In contrast to most cross-national surveys, these annual cross-sectional
surveys conducted between 2013 and 2016 contain questions on party place-
ments on economic and cultural issues along with those on a left-right scale.
The time span between surveys is relatively short, so certain contextual factors
can be assumed to be fixed. Furthermore, the sampling strategy and the ques-
tionnaires are identical in all four surveys.
Translating our hypotheses to the case of the AfD, we can formulate the
following expectations: first, the more important cultural topics became in
the AfD’s programmatic orientation, the more voters based their perceptions
of the AfD’s left-right position on its perceived position on the cultural sub-
dimension. Vice versa, voters based their perceptions of the AfD’s left-right
position less on its perceived position on the economic dimension after the
party’s programmatic shift in 2015 (H1). Second, the extent to which respon-
dents map the AfD’s policy position on the left-right dimension to its cultural
or economic issues stances depends on how important the respective sub-
dimension is to the respondent (H2).
Data and methods
The dependent variable in our analysis is a respondent’s perception of the
AfD’s policy position on a left-right scale. The key independent variables are
the perceived party issue positions on redistribution (economic sub-dimen-
sion) and migration (cultural sub-dimension). All three variables are measured
on an eleven-point scale.3 Unfortunately, many respondents could not locate
the AfD on all (sub-)dimensions (see Appendix B). To avoid listwise deletion,
we use hot deck imputation as a rather conservative approach of dealing
with this issue (Andridge and Little 2010).4
To measure changes in the party issue agenda (Hypothesis 1), we rely on
content analyses of party press releases from 2013 to 2016 (N = 1,311). Party
press releases constitute an ideal basis for measuring a party’s issue agenda
between elections. Unlike manifestos, they are published continuously. More-
over, they are freely available and directed towards journalists and a wider
public. Following previous research (Klüver and Sagarzazu 2016; Sagarzazu
and Klüver 2017), we use the expressed agenda model developed by
Grimmer (2010) to classify party press releases into issue clusters. This unsuper-
visedmodel technique creates topics ofwords that cluster together (e.g. “euro”,
“ecb”, and “bank”) and assigns press releases to those topics that fit best. We
3Information on question wording and scaling can be found in Appendix A.
4Four indicators are used for the imputation process: the three aforementioned perceived party positions
and the perceived party position on the EU integration issue. Appendix C shows the regression results
based on the samples with and without imputation. The results in both analyses are very similar and lead
to identical conclusions.
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then derive word stems (i.e. words without affixes) that serve as input for the
analysis and remove those that are used in less than 1% of all documents.
The number of issue categories (or “topics”) is not determined by the model.
Following previous research (e.g. Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Klüver and
Sagarzazu 2016; Sagarzazu and Klüver 2017), we therefore estimate the
model for a varying number of those categories (from 7 to 17) and chose the
model with the most meaningful and distinct issue categories. We then
cluster issues related to economic or cultural issues to measure the salience
of both issue dimensions. Issues at the European level related to monetary
policy (e.g. Greece, “Euro” as currency) are coded as economic issues.5
Additional information on the topic model and validity checks are outlined in
Appendix E. To match the party’s issue agenda with the survey data, we only
use the press releases published in the four months prior to the field time.6
To measure personal issue emphasis (Hypothesis 2), we use the “most
important” and “second-most important” problems identified by the respon-
dents. We rely on the GLES coding scheme of responses and identify issues
related to socio-economic and socio-cultural issues. For each respondent,
we calculate the share of responses that refer to economic and cultural
issues, respectively.
In addition, we include several control variables: To capture assimilation
and contrast effects in the respondents’ perceptions of party policy positions
(e.g. Merrill, Grofman, and Adams 2001), we include an interaction of the
respondents’ own policy preferences and their sympathy towards the AfD
(11-point scale). Because respondents tend to mix issue importance and
issue positions when answering survey items (e.g. Wagner and Zeglovits
2014), personal issue emphasis might also indicate more extreme issue prefer-
ences. To account for personal issue extremism, we use the respondents’ per-
sonal policy preferences (also measured on an 11-point scale) on economic
and cultural issues along with their squared terms.7 Moreover, we control
for education (low/medium/high), sex, age (in years), subjective class (blue
collar, lower middle, middle, and upper class), and whether the respondent
lives in East or West Germany to capture any remaining variation in respon-
dents’ perceptions of the AfD’s left-right position.
Weuse a censored regressionmodel (Tobitmodel) with standard errors clus-
tered by years to explain respondents’ perceptions of the AfD’s policy position
on the 11-point left-right scale. In contrast to an ordinary least squares
5Including European integration as a third issue dimension into our analysis does not alter our main con-
clusions (see Appendix D).
6As we have four survey waves, this variable only varies across issue dimensions and years. In an additional
analysis (shown in Appendix F), we report the results of a macro-level analysis with mean perceived
party policy positions. Although based on a small number of observations, the results are in line with
those reported in this manuscript.
7As shown in Model 3 in Appendix D, excluding this control variable does not alter the conclusions regard-
ing our hypotheses.
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regression, this model accounts for the fact that responses are constrained to
an 11-point scale. This is particularly relevant for the AfD, as about 30% of
respondents locate the party at the right end of the scale (11). The censored
regressionmodel accounts for upper and lower limits, but is otherwise identical
to a linear regression model for values that fall between the two extremes.
If y∗i denotes respondent i’s true (latent) perception of the AfD’s policy pos-
ition, then
yi =
1 if y∗i ≤ 1
y∗i if 1 , y
∗
i , 11
11 if y∗i ≥ 1
⎧⎨
⎩
denotes the chosen (perceived) policy position on the 11-point left right scale.
We can model public perceptions of the AfD’s left-right position y∗i based on
its (perceived) positions on economic and cultural issues.
Explaining voter perceptions of party policy positions on the
left-right scale
Are perceptions of the AfD’s left-right position shaped by supply-side,
demand-side factors, or both? Table 1 shows the regression results. Since
we test hypotheses referring to conditional effects, however, we present
the main findings using graphs.8
Figure 2 shows the marginal effect of the economic (left panel) and the cul-
tural sub-dimension (right panel) for varying levels of party issue importance
(Hypothesis 1). In the left panel, there is no significant evidence that party
issue attention to the economy affects how much attention respondents put
on its economic issue position when evaluating the AfD on the left-right
scale. While the marginal effect increases with growing party issue attention
(as expected), the increase is small and statistically insignificant. However,
we do find evidence that respondents align the AfD’s left-right position with
its position on cultural issues when the party addresses these issues to a
greater extent. The party’s emphasis on these issues increased steadily from
about 5% (2013) to 9% (2014) to roughly 28 and 31% in 2015 and 2016, respect-
ively. In 2013, when the AfD’s emphasis on cultural issues was rather low, shift-
ing the AfD’s perceived cultural position by one unit to the right corresponds
with a rightward shift of 0.23 units of the perceived policy position on the left-
right dimension. This effect becomes about twice as large (0.44) in 2016, after
the party focused on cultural issues. This finding is in line with Hypothesis 1.
Turning to the demand side, Figure 3 gives information on our test of
Hypothesis 2. We indeed find evidence that personal issue emphasis
8For the estimation of the linear predictions, all independent variables (including binary indicators) are set
to their empirically observed values.
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structures the relationship of the two issue dimensions and the left-right pos-
ition: The more citizens care about issues related to economic (left panel) or
cultural issues (right panel), the stronger the association of that issue dimen-
sion with the perceived left-right position of the AfD. Yet, the slope for econ-
omic issues is relatively flat and the effect is not robust across different model
specifications (see Appendix C).
In contrast, the moderating effect on the cultural issue dimension is sub-
stantialy stronger: for citizens who think socio-cultural issues are not among
the most important concerns, a one unit change (to the right) on cultural




DV: Perceived left-right party position AfD
Party position: economy 0.517*** (0.115)
Party position: culture 0.263 (0.218)
H1
Party issue emphasis: economy −6.209+ (3.209)
Party issue emphasis: economy X Party position: economy 0.114 (0.124)
Party issue emphasis: culture −2.136 (4.830)
Party issue emphasis: culture X Party position: culture 0.717* (0.299)
H2
Personal issue emphasis: economy −1.054 (0.766)
Personal issue emphasis: economy X Party position: economy 0.167+ (0.092)
Personal issue emphasis: culture −2.420+ (1.353)
Personal issue emphasis: culture X Party position: culture 0.283* (0.116)
Control variables
Personal issue position: economy 1.150* (0.450)
Personal issue position: economy X Personal issue position: economy −0.086* (0.037)
Personal issue position: economy X Party position: economy −0.160** (0.055)
Personal issue position: economy X Personal issue position: economy X
Party position: economy
0.011* (0.005)
Personal issue position: culture 0.300 (0.594)
Personal issue position: culture X Personal issue position: culture −0.020 (0.041)
Personal issue position: culture X Party position: culture −0.022 (0.058)
Personal issue position: culture X Personal issue position: culture X Party
position: culture
0.000 (0.004)
Self-placement: left-right 0.202*** (0.044)
Party sympathy −1.031*** (0.169)






Social class (reference: blue collar)
lower middle class −0.265 (0.170)
middle class −0.176 (0.164)
upper class 0.197* (0.089)





Standard errors in parentheses, SEs clustered by year (survey); +p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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issues corresponds with a 0.28 unit change (to the right) of the AfD’s per-
ceived left-right position. For citizens who identify only socio-cultural issues
as the most important ones, the correspondance between a one-unit
change to the right on the socio-cultural dimention and the perceived polition
on the left-right dimension is again about twice as large (0.58).9
Figure 2. Supply-side effects on issue mapping, party issue emphasis (H1).
Note: Solid lines show the marginal effect of the economic (left panel) and the cultural issue position (right
panel) depending on the attention to these issues in the party’s press releases (x-axis). The vertical bars
denote the empirical values in party issue emphasis for both sub-dimensions. Shaded areas denote 95%
confidence intervals. All estimates based on the Tobit model shown in Table 1.
Figure 3. Demand-side effects on issue mapping, personal issue emphasis (H2).
Note: Solid lines show the marginal effect of the economic (left panel) and the cultural issue position (right
panel) depending on the respondents’ issue emphasis (x-axis). The vertical bars denote the empirical
values in personal issue emphasis for both sub-dimensions (small jitter added). Shaded areas denote
95% confidence intervals. All estimates based on the Tobit model shown in Table 1.
9We find similar, although substantially weaker, effects of personal issue emphasis using a pooled sample
with seven German parties (CDU, CSU, FDP, Greens, SPD and The Left in addition to the AfD) for the
period under research (Appendix H). Appendix H also presents additional party-specific models.
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Implications for vote choice
Finally, we turn to an important implication of our findings for political behav-
iour. If left-right placements of parties and voters may stem from different
underlying issue dimensions, party-voter proximity on the left-right dimen-
sion might affect political behaviour only if a voter’s and a party’s mappings
are identical. We study this question by considering the effect of left-right
proximity between individuals and parties as a predictor of vote choice. We
expect that the effect of party-voter proximity on vote choice should increase
if the voter’s and the party’s left-right positions are based on the same under-
lying issue dimensions.
We estimated a vote intentionmodel for the AfD, controlling for party sympa-
thy, education, sex, age, subjective class, andwhether the respondent lives in East
orWest Germany. Our key predictor is an interaction between left-right proximity
and the congruenceof demand- and supply-side salience.10 The latter runs from0
Figure 4. Conditioning effect of salience congruence on left-right proximity for AfD vote
intention.
Note: Solid lines show the marginal effect of the left-right proximity depending on the congruence of
demand- and supply-side salience (x-axis). The vertical bars denote the empirical values in congruence
(small jitter added). Shaded areas denote 95% confidence intervals. All estimates based on the logit
model shown in Appendix G.
Results indicate that we find the most support for parties with heterogeneous position, e.g., economi-
cally left and culturally right positions – or, the other way around. This is especially the case for the AfD
and the FDP – and to a weaker degree for the Greens.
10Appendix G provides detailed information of how the congruence measure was constructed as well as a
table representing the regression results. We run a logistic model explaining vote intention for the AfD
in comparison to voting for any other party.
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(very low congruence) to 1 (very high congruence) and compares the relative sal-
ience of both sub-dimensions between an individual and the party.
Figure 4 underlines the relevance of our theoretical arguments and
approach: Left-right proximity to the AfD is only relevant for citizens if salience
congruence is reasonably high. The positive moderating effect of congruence
depicted in Figure 4 can be further substantiated: the effect of left-right proxi-
mity on vote choice is about twice as large for respondents in full correspon-
dence with the party’s issue agenda compared to those with a medium level
of issue agreement (0.5). Clearly, our approach to explaining perceived party
positions matters also in terms of electoral behaviour.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a supply- and demand-side perspective on when
and how the substantive meaning of party positions on the left-right dimen-
sion changes. We argued that individuals map party issue positions on the
general left-right scale from cultural and economic sub-dimensions. More-
over, the importance of each issue sub-dimension depends both on a
party’s issue agenda (supply side) and the citizens’ issue concerns (demand
side). We tested these arguments looking at perceptions of the AfD and we
find that the party’s stronger focus on cultural issues in its public agenda
from 2015 onwards had a strong impact on how respondents map the
party on the left-right dimension. Due to the AfD’s changed issue agenda
the cultural sub-dimension became much more important in how citizens
place the party on the left-right dimension. Citizens who deemed cultural
issues to be important also give more weight to the AfD’s stances on cultural
issues in thinking about the party’s left-right position.
These findings suggest that the meaning of the left-right dimension as the
major line of conflict can indeed change over time (e.g. de Vries, Hakhverdian,
and Lancee 2013) and that these changes can be the result of supply- and
demand-side factors. Perceptions of party policy positions on the left-right
dimension might thus result from changes in issue emphasis, even if the
parties’ actual policy positions on economic or cultural issues stay the same.
With regard to vote choice and substantive representation, our findings
point to the pitfalls of the “amorphous” (Huber and Inglehart 1995, 90) character
of the left-right dimension: voter-party proximity on the left-right dimension is
only meaningful if voters and parties have a similar understanding of left and
right. The flipside of our argument is that parties can actually shift their positions
on the left-right dimension in two ways: by actually changing their policy pos-
itions on issue dimensions (such as the economy) or by a more subtle, less risky
strategy of changing their emphasis on certain issues (Meyer andWagner 2017).
There are several avenues to extend this analysis. First, there is obviously a
necessity to move beyond the single case of the AfD and to study changes in
JOURNAL OF ELECTIONS, PUBLIC OPINION AND PARTIES 15
perceived party left-right positions cross-nationally. Despite current limit-
ations in terms of data availability, similar analyses might be feasible in
different countries. Without further analysis, we cannot be sure whether our
findings also hold for other parties or in different contexts. The AfD could
be considered as a special case to observe changes in voter perceptions, as
these changes might be most pronounced for rather new parties that also
focus on non-economic issues.
Second, it would be interesting to extend this analysis to study how the
party system (e.g. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015; Meyer and Wagner
2018) and the media agenda (e.g. McCombs 2004) affect perceptions of
party left-right positions. In the present analysis, these effects are subsumed
in a party’s issue attention that is subject to change in the party system
(e.g. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2015) and a cause for changes in the
media agenda (e.g. Brandenburg 2002). Yet, both the party system and the
media agenda may have independent effects in how individuals think
about current problems and evaluate parties on the left-right scale.
Finally, we could also think of other issues and issue dimensions where
“mapping” from lower-level issues to a higher level might be relevant. For
example, a party’s position on cultural issues represents a summary statement
of its policy positions on gender issues, law and order policy, and immigration.
Similar to the argument presented above, a party’s (perceived) policy position
on the cultural issue dimension might shift to the left (or right) when individ-
ual policies where parties hold liberal (or conservative) positions gain impor-
tance. Overall, left-right thinking and discourse appears to remain important,
even if the content of that dimension has (been) shifted over time.
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